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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since California enacted the first security breach notification law (SBNL) 
in 2002,1 a tidal wave of security breach notices has been unleashed on 
American consumers, making the problem of inadequate information securi-
ty in American businesses visible to the public for the first time. These laws 
should provide American businesses with incentives to make significant 
changes in the way they handle and store consumer information in order to 
reduce the risk that the security of that data will be breached, or at least to 
reduce the risk that they will be required to notify their customers that a 
breach has occurred. While SBNLs do appear to be raising public awareness 
of the problem of computer security, it is unclear what, if any, impact SBNLs 
are having on the total volume of security breaches, or information security 
more generally.2 In the years since the first SBNL was passed, the incessant 
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 1. S.B. 1386, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), codified at CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 1798.29, 1798.80-.84 (2009). 
 2. In 2007, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner was reported as saying that ―evi-
dence is emerging that laws to force disclosure of data breaches have a deterrent effect and 
that it then becomes part of the mindset of businesses to protect themselves against the lia-
bilities that can arise,‖ although no data was cited to support these assertions. Tom Pullar-
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drumbeat of public disclosures of security breaches in the mass media sug-
gests that significant improvements in the security of business information 
systems may be slow in coming.3 
Part of the problem may be the limited scope of SBNLs themselves, 
which has created a fragmented, incoherent liability scheme. The nature of 
any causal connection between security breaches and concrete harms suf-
fered by consumers such as identity theft remains unclear.4 Because Ameri-
can consumers are not protected by a general right of information privacy, 
mere notice that a security breach has occurred is not associated with any 
right to compensation.5 Attempts to establish a right to damages following 
receipt of a security breach notice through class action lawsuits have general-
ly only succeeded in clarifying the degree to which no such right exists,6 al-
                                                                                                                         
Strecker, Data breach law investigated; Statutory code may be alternative to legislation, THE DOMINION 
POST, June 11, 2007, at 5. In 2008, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University found that 
SBNLs were having almost no discernable impact on the volume of identity theft, and noted 
without reaching any conclusion that they might be changing business behavior. Sasha Ro-
manosky et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?, SOCIAL SCIENCE RE-
SEARCH NETWORK, Sept. 16, 2008, at 16, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268926 (follow 
―Download‖ hyperlink). See also Marcus Ranum & Bruce Schneier, Face-Off: State Data Breach 
Notification Laws-Have they Helped?, SEARCHSECURITYASIA.COM, Jan. 20, 2009, 
http://www.searchsecurityasia.com/content/face-state-data-breach-notification-laws-have-
they-helped (Ranum argues that SBNLs are ―a huge distraction that has more to do with 
butt-covering and paperwork than improving systems security‖ while Schneier supports the 
use of SBNLs to shame companies for bad security and to provide data for research). 
 3. In 2009, the Ponemon Institute reported that 21 percent of organizations surveyed 
had encryption strategies, up from 16 percent in 2007. THE PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2008 
ANNUAL STUDY: U.S. ENTERPRISE ENCRYPTION TRENDS 2 (2008), http://www.ponemon 
.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/2008_Annual_Study_US_Encryption_Tre
nds_280308.pdf. The study was sponsored by PGP, a major vendor of encryption software, 
and focused on U.S. information technology companies, a population likely to be more 
aware of information security issues than companies in other sectors of the economy. Id. 
 4. Romanosky et al., supra note 2, at 2-3. 
 5. See generally JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE § 14 (Aspen Law & Business 4th ed. Supp. 2009) (providing an overview of the 
limitations of information privacy rights under U.S. Law).  
 6. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
increased risk of identity theft is not a cognizable harm); Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv., 
594 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. La. 2009); Aliano v. Tex. Roadhouse Holdings, L.L.C., 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 104428 (E.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2008); Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, 
Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Melancon v. La. Office of Student Fin. Assis-
tance, 567 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. La. 2008); Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22494 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008); Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705 
(S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a duty of care was owed and breached, but paying for credit 
monitoring is not an injury); Ponder v. Pfizer, 522 F. Supp. 2d 793 (M.D. La. 2007). But cf. 
Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, 254 Fed. Appx. 664 (9th Cir. 2007) (reinstating 
an identity theft victim suit even with only circumstantial evidence of causation, but holding 
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though many businesses suffering breaches have chosen on a voluntary basis 
to provide their customers with credit monitoring services to reduce the risk 
of harm from identity theft.7 
Analyzing SBNLs from a regulatory impact perspective shows that they 
impose high compliance costs on relatively few businesses while providing 
only weak incentives to most businesses to make major changes in the securi-
ty of their information systems. SBNLs were modeled after ―community 
right to know‖ (CRTK) laws, which were developed in order to improve the 
efficacy of environmental laws.8 CRTK laws can enhance the impact of other 
regulation—such as mandatory minimum levels of computer security for 
businesses that handle sensitive consumer information or a right to statutory 
damages for breaches of the privacy of personal information—but alone 
cannot provide a coherent regulatory framework.9 The narrow, targeted ap-
proach taken in SBNLs may be justified in political terms as a tactic calcu-
lated to generate widespread American public support for stronger informa-
tion privacy laws, or as the broadest form of computer security law that 
could actually be enacted in America today. If this is the case, however, then 
there is a large gap between what may have been politically expedient and 
what would be socially or economically optimal. 
If SBNLs are having an impact on corporate behavior, that impact ap-
pears to be modest even among many of the most sophisticated companies. 
In 2009, a report was published of a review of the ―risk factors‖ sections of 
the 10-K filings of publicly listed Fortune 500 companies as a means of as-
sessing the recognition within those companies of privacy and data security 
issues.10 The study concluded that even many Fortune 500 companies do not 
appear to appreciate fully the financial and reputational risks posed by fail-
                                                                                                                         
that credit monitoring victims cannot proceed); Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Employees v. Hawley, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25308 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2008) (holding that damages for distress may 
be permitted under Privacy Act after TSA lost TSA employees‘ personal information). 
 7. E.g., Jenn Abelson, Breach of Data at TJX is Called the Biggest Ever, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Mar. 29, 2007, at A1. In that instance, TJX offered credit monitoring for customers whose 
driver‘s license numbers were exposed in a security breach. Id. 
 8. Compare Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2009) with CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.28, 1798.80-.84 (2009). 
 9. NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 65 (1998). 
 10. In 2008, Hiscox and consulting firm NetDilligence surveyed 60 US organizations in 
different sectors including healthcare, retail, and financial services; and ranging in annual 
revenue from tens of millions to billions. Hiscox, Data Privacy and Corporate America: 
Who‘s Recognizing the Risk? (Apr. 2009), http://www.hiscox.com/Downloads/d2899def-
619c-4147-bbe4-3a85426a44c4.pdf. 
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ures to secure databases of sensitive personal information.11 With regard to 
the use of encryption, which California‘s and many other state‘s SBNLs rec-
ognize as a safe harbor that can reduce or eliminate the need to provide no-
tices following a security breach, the white paper reported on a separate 
study of sixty U.S. companies. That study found that only seven percent had 
implemented end-to-end encryption of sensitive data; forty-two percent of 
the companies investigated had suffered a data breach, and of those only 
twelve percent had encryption in place for data at rest; forty-seven percent of 
the companies had not fully implemented laptop encryption; and twenty-nine 
percent of the companies had not fully implemented back-up tape encryp-
tion.12 While no similar data exists for small and medium-sized enterprises, it 
would be reasonable to expect that management attention to security breach 
risks and use of encryption technologies would be even lower among such 
companies. 
This Article will evaluate the provisions of California‘s pioneering SBNL 
in light of ―better regulation‖ or ―smart regulation‖13 criteria in order to high-
light the costs of taking a narrowly focused, piecemeal approach and the 
benefits of taking a more comprehensive perspective to the problems of 
identity theft and information security. Just as the basic structure of SBNLs 
was borrowed from environmental law, this Article will borrow from decades 
of analysis of the impact of environmental regulation to evaluate the likely 
impact of SBNLs. Just as environmental laws can be used to reduce exter-
nalities created through the mismanagement of common pool resources 
found in the natural environment, information security laws can be used to 
reduce externalities created through the mismanagement of common pool 
resources found in the virtual environment. If the analogy to environmental 
law is well drawn and the problem of identity theft is recognized as only a 
symptom of larger underlying systemic problems—including inadequate in-
formation system security14—then a narrow, piecemeal regulatory strategy 
will be no substitute for an integrated, multi-faceted regulatory strategy.15 
                                                                                                                         
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. at 11. 
 13. See infra Part II for an explanation of what constitutes ―better regulation‖ or ―smart 
regulation.‖  
 14. Identity theft may be a symptom of other problems as well. See, e.g., Ranum & 
Schneier, supra note 2 (―What we really need are laws prohibiting financial institutions from 
granting credit to someone using your name with only a minimum of authentication.‖). 
 15. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 15 (―The central thesis of this book 
is that recruiting a range of regulatory actors to implement complementary combinations of 
policy instruments, tailored to specific environmental goals and circumstances, will produce 
more effective and efficient regulatory outcomes.‖); see also DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 217-18 (2006) (noting that the new environmental regula-
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To provide a framework within which the provisions of SBNLs can be 
analyzed, Part II of this Article provides a general overview of academic and 
political ―better regulation‖ initiatives undertaken in recent decades. While 
the Clinton Administration‘s emphasis on ―reinventing government‖ was 
displaced by the Bush Administration‘s emphasis on ―deregulation‖ in the 
United States, outside the United States interest in ―smart regulation‖ strate-
gies continued to grow during the 2000s and are likely to enjoy a new vogue 
under the Obama Administration. In Part III, California‘s pioneering SBNL 
is analyzed in light of better regulation principles, which spotlights some ob-
vious shortcomings of the legislation. The business, technological, and regu-
latory challenges posed by any effort to reduce the volume of security 
breaches are analyzed in Part IV. Given the enormity of those challenges, it 
should come as no surprise that a regulatory scheme as limited in scope as 
SBNLs is having only a modest impact on the information security policies 
of database owners. Because information security problems are complex and 
multi-faceted, they may defy any attempt to resolve them with simple solu-
tions. If achieving a significant reduction in the volume of data breaches is 
taken seriously as a policy goal, then there may be no alternative but to face 
the challenges of developing and enacting not just ―better‖ SBNLs, but a bet-
ter general ―information security‖ regime. 
II. WHAT MAKES “BETTER” REGULATION BETTER? 
In 1992, Ian Ayres and Jon Braithwaite described many of the basic prin-
ciples now recognized as essential elements of ―better‖ or ―smart‖ regulation 
in their book RESPONSIVE REGULATION.16 They approached the theoretical 
goal of transcending the artificial constraints of the ―regulation versus dere-
gulation‖ political conflict by focusing on an apparent paradox observed in 
attempts to assess the effectiveness of regulation: while it would come as no 
surprise to anyone that lax regulatory regimes engender low levels of com-
pliance, merely reversing strategy and adopting a harsh regulatory regime is 
unlikely to raise levels of compliance.17 Ayres and Braithwaite argued that 
deploying an integrated array of strategies, beginning with collaborative en-
gagement and ending with termination of business activity, would achieve the 
best regulatory outcomes.18 With such a strategy, regulators respond diffe-
                                                                                                                         
tion would be a more adaptable, performance based-learning system achieved by combining 
higher order fundamental decisions with lower order, incremental decisions). 
 16. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
 17. Id. at 19-20, 25. 
 18. Id. at 40. 
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rently depending on whether the regulated entity manifests voluntary com-
pliance or refuses to cooperate.19 As shown in Figure 1, this integrated ap-
proach to regulation is often illustrated as a ―regulatory pyramid‖ with the 
mildest and most commonly used regulatory responses at the base and the 
most severe and infrequently used responses at the apex. 
Figure 1: Regulatory Pyramid 
 
Around the same time that Ayres and Braithwaite were writing about 
responsive regulation, President Clinton established the National Perfor-
mance Review, an ambitious effort to streamline government, reduce top-
down bureaucracy and reliance on command-and-control regulations, and 
introduce new government policies and procedures modeled on private sec-
tor institutions.20 In the United Kingdom, similar policies were put in place 
                                                                                                                         
 19. Id. at 35. 
 20. Remarks by President Clinton Announcing the Initiative to Streamline Govern-
ment, Mar. 3, 1993, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/speeches/030393.html; Na-
tional Performance Review, Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less 
(1993); Congressional Research Service, Implementation of National Performance Review 
Recommendations (Oct. 27, 1993). Many of these ideas were captured in David Osborne 
and Ted Gaebler‘s influential book on reinventing government. See generally DAVID OS-
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following the Labour Party‘s victory in 1997, with the creation of the Better 
Regulation Task Force.21 The Better Regulation Task Force‘s mission was to 
ensure that regulation in the United Kingdom complied with the five Prin-
ciples of Good Regulation: 
Proportionate: Regulators should only intervene when necessary. Remedies 
should be appropriate to the risk posed, and costs identified and mi-
nimized; 
Accountable: Regulators must be able to justify decisions, and be subject to 
public scrutiny;  
Consistent: Government rules and standards must be joined up and im-
plemented fairly;  
Transparent: Regulators should be open, and keep regulations simple and 
user friendly; [and] 
Targeted: Regulation should be focused on the problem and minimize side 
effects.22 
In 1998, Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky provided a systematic 
account of ―smart‖ regulation, which they defined as the use of appropriate 
combinations of policy instruments to achieve a goal.23 They reaffirmed 
Ayres and Braithwaite‘s insight that progress in increasing the effectiveness 
of regulation requires moving beyond the ―regulation-deregulation‖ dichot-
omy. They also suggested that a consensus was then emerging in support of 
the use of non-governmental actors (which may be businesses or non-
commercial third parties, depending on the context) as ―quasi-regulators‖ in 
combination with private incentives and traditional government regulation as 
the most efficient method of achieving policy goals.24 Smart regulation there-
fore requires comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of differ-
ent policy instruments, and the design of governance institutions tailored to 
the context in which the targeted social problem arose. The various policy 
instruments or ―tools of government‖ that might be used to achieve a smart 
                                                                                                                         
BORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1993). 
 21. Better Regulation Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, http://archive.cab-
inetoffice.gov.uk/brc/faqs.html (last visited June 6, 2009). 
 22. Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of Good Regulation (1998) (revised 2000), 
http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/publications/principlesentry.html (emphasis add-
ed). 
 23. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 15 (1998). 
 24. Id. at 11-15. 
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regulation strategy include: direct provision of goods and services by gov-
ernment; direct regulation to achieve social or economic goals; government 
contracting with private-sector entities; government grants, loans, and loan 
guarantees; government-sponsored insurance programs; tax incentives; fees 
and charges; liability laws; and provision of goods or services by quasi-public 
agencies or government corporations, or through voucher programs.25 In 
order to move beyond the simple regulation-deregulation dichotomy, the 
parties involved must not be limited to government and business, but should 
include public interest groups, industry associations, independent third-party 
certification or rating agencies, professionals (including lawyers, accountants, 
and consultants), and third-party businesses such as private-sector insurance 
companies.26 
Although the United States was a leader in developing ―smart regulation‖ 
strategies under the Clinton Administration, these developments largely came 
to a halt at the federal level in 2000 when the Bush Administration chose not 
to build on them, but to return to the ―deregulation‖ branch of the old regu-
lation-deregulation dichotomy.27 By contrast, exploring new forms of gover-
nance has emerged as a major strategy of European Union political leaders 
and regulators since the launch of the ―Lisbon Strategy‖ in 2000.28 The Lis-
bon Strategy was intended to make Europe ―the most competitive and dy-
namic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.‖29 The 
Mandelkern Group was established by the Council of the European Union as 
a high-level consultative group to develop a ―better regulation‖ strategy for 
the European Union.30 In 2001, this was followed by a white paper outlining 
how the European Union‘s better regulation strategy would be implemented 
by requiring the Commission to conduct impact assessments before new leg-
islation is introduced, simplifying existing European regulations, conducting 
public consultations for all Commission initiatives, and considering alterna-
tives to conventional regulation such as self-regulation or co-regulation.31 
                                                                                                                         
 25. LESTER SALAMON, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GO-
VERNANCE 21 (2002). 
 26. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 93-134. 
 27. FIORINO, supra note 15, at 60, 213-14. 
 28. Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 Presidency Conclusions, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. PE 289.667 (2000), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/-
lis1_en.htm. 
 29. Id. at 12. 
 30. MANDELKERN GROUP, MANDELKERN GROUP ON BETTER REGULATION, FINAL 
REPORT 8 (2001), http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/mandel-
kern_report.pdf. 
 31. White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001). 
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In order for ―smart regulation‖ to work, however, legislatures and regula-
tors must accurately assess the risks associated with the use of different poli-
cy instruments, and the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 starkly illu-
strates how difficult that can be.32 The United Kingdom may have gone fur-
ther than other countries in embracing ―smart‖ or ―light touch‖ regulation,33 
as evidenced by a 2005 report issued by the Better Regulation Task Force 
entitled ―Regulation-Less is More.‖34 During the global financial crisis, the 
United Kingdom has suffered some of the most severe economic reverses of 
any country, in large part as a result of financial and real estate bubbles fueled 
by lax regulation of financial markets.35 One possible explanation for the ap-
parent failure of ―smart‖ or ―light touch‖ regulation of financial markets in 
London might be found in the academic literature on behavioral adaptation 
and risk compensation.36 However, the analysis of issues such as the optimal 
regulatory strategy for dealing with systemic risk in global financial markets is 
beyond the scope of this Article.37 
The notion of ―better regulation‖ emerged as a result of frustration with 
the social costs of both unregulated markets and traditional command-and-
control regulation, but it requires a high degree of foresight and competence 
on the part of lawmakers and regulators to succeed. In order to achieve ―bet-
                                                                                                                         
 32. Curbs on Risky Banking Proposed, BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2009, http://-
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7948791.stm (reporting that the UK financial crisis was due 
to failure of ―light touch‖ regulation used by Financial Services Authority since 1997). 
 33. Beginning in the late 1990s, the United Kingdom Labour Government often advo-
cated ―light touch‖ regulation as an intermediate position between deregulation and tradi-
tional regulation. See, e.g., David Gow & Mark Atkinson, Blair Plans War on Red Tape, THE 
GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov, 3, 1999, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/-
business/1999/nov/03/7/. 
 34. Better Regulation Task Force, Regulation – Less is More (2005), available at 
 http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/lessismore.pdf. 
 35. David Smith, Gordon Brown Says: London Is Not “Reykjavik on the Thames,” THE 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/-
economics/article5627301.ece. Following liberalization of Iceland‘s banking system in 2003, 
its main commercial banks grew rapidly by taking foreign deposits and making foreign loans. 
Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, those banks failed, causing the 
collapse of Iceland‘s financial system in October 2008. See generally Iceland: Cracks in the Crust, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 11; Media Eghbal, Global Financial Crisis: Recession Bits into 
Western Europe, EUROMONITOR INT‘L, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.euromonitor.com/-
The_global_financial_crisis_recession_bites_into_Western_Europe. 
 36. James Hedlund, Risky Business: Safety Regulations, Risk Compensation, and Individual 
Behavior, 6 INJURY PREVENTION 82 (2000). 
 37. Not all ―light touch‖ regulation ideas are bad ideas. For example, the United King-
dom government created the Child Trust Fund to help children learn about savings and in-
vestment by the time they turn 18 by creating investment accounts of £250 at birth for all 
children born after 2002. Child Trust Fund, http://www.childtrustfund.gov.uk/ (last visited 
July 9, 2009). 
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ter regulation,‖ the institutions to be regulated must be analyzed, and appro-
priate policy instruments must be selected and then harmonized into an inte-
grated framework. Lawmakers and regulators must grasp the logic of estab-
lished social relations, review a wide spectrum of different policy instruments 
and incentive systems, be prepared to delegate selected oversight functions to 
self-regulatory programs, take steps to promote constructive dialogue be-
tween regulator and regulated entity, and finally design and implement tar-
geted enforcement programs. Imposing such high standards on lawmakers 
and regulators may appear unrealistic, especially when contrasted with the 
relative simplicity of ―deregulation‖ as a reform agenda. In many areas of 
public policy, however, the shortcomings of both unregulated markets and 
direct regulation have also been clearly demonstrated.38 In order to achieve 
complex, novel social goals such as a significant reduction in security breach-
es, better regulation strategies may turn out to be like democracy, which 
Churchill famously noted was ―the worst form of government except for all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time.‖39 
III. CALIFORNIA’S SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION 
LAW 
On April 5, 2002, the Stephen P. Teale Data Center, one of California‘s 
two general-purpose data centers, suffered a security breach that was not dis-
covered until May 7, 2002, and state employees were not notified until May 
21, 2002.40 In response, California legislators enacted Senate Bill 1386, which 
requires that any state agency, person, or business in California disclose that a 
security breach had occurred to those whose computerized information had 
been accessed.41 These notices to individuals whose personal information is 
exposed by the breach may be delayed if necessary to avoid impeding a crim-
inal investigation.42 The legislative findings provided in support of Senate Bill 
1386 included findings that the risk to the privacy and financial security of 
individuals as a result of widespread collection of personal information was 
growing; that the personal information needed to accomplish identity theft 
exists in many forms and is widely used for a variety of legitimate purposes; 
identity theft is one of the fastest growing crimes committed in California, 
which imposes substantial costs on both California consumers and business-
                                                                                                                         
 38. See FIORINO, supra note 15, at 1-25. 
 39. Winston Churchill, Speech at the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947).  
 40. Personal Information: Disclosure; Breach of Security: Hearing on S.B. 1386 Before 
the Assem. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2002 Leg. (2002).  
 41. S.B. 1386, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82. 
 42. Id. 
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es; and that rapid notice to consumers that a security breach has occurred 
may help consumers to minimize the damage that occurs from identity 
theft.43 
The legislative history of California‘s security breach notification law re-
veals several interesting features. First, that a huge security breach exposed 
California state payroll data but weeks passed before the victims were noti-
fied suggests that legislators were interested not only in reducing the risk of 
such breaches in the future, but also in getting even: compliance with SBNLs 
can ―shame‖ companies with bad security. This feature may intensify other 
incentives pushing companies handling large volumes of sensitive personal 
data to improve their security.44 The shaming function of SBNLs is direct 
and concrete, while any incentive they provide to improve security is indirect 
and uncertain. 
In one way, SBNLs conform to the ―smart regulation‖ model of Gun-
ningham and Grabowsky because enforcement of the laws is delegated to 
non-governmental parties.45 The delegation is fraught with peril, however, 
because it is not made to an independent third party or quasi-governmental 
agency,46 but made directly to the regulated entity itself, with no government 
audit or examination function to assess compliance levels. Even when public 
resources are committed to policing compliance, ―slippage‖ problems may 
arise when regulators make ad hoc, inconsistent exceptions in enforcement.47 
When no public resources are committed to policing compliance, then slip-
page may become the norm.48  
So while on the surface SBNLs appear to create a huge compliance obli-
gation across the entire U.S. economy, touching all businesses that handle 
                                                                                                                         
 43. S.B. 1386 § 1, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). 
 44. Posting of Bruce Schneier to Schneier on Security Blog, Identity-Theft Disclosure 
Laws, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/identitytheft_d.html (Apr. 26, 
2006 08:11 EST). 
 45. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 93-134. 
 46. Government corporations such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, or the American 
National Standards Institute are examples of private organizations that act as quasi-
governmental agencies. See About Fannie Mae: Our Charter, http://www.fanniemae.com/-
aboutfm/charter.jhtml; Freddie Mac: Company Profile, http://www.freddiemac.com/-
corporate/company_profile/; Introduction to ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/-
introduction/introduction.aspx. 
 47. PETER MENELL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at xiii (2002). 
 48. This would not be the case if enforcement resources are supplied by a different 
regulatory regime. For example, the obligations of publicly listed companies under the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act to maintain effective internal controls may contribute to higher levels of 
compliance with SBNLs than those among non-public companies. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a) 
(2006). Analysis of the relationship between SBNLs and Sarbanes-Oxley Act is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
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sensitive personal information, in reality large-scale non-compliance with 
SBNLs is not only possible but entirely predictable.49 This is because rational 
actors are presumed to be deterred by legal prohibitions when the cost of the 
violation exceeds the benefits they expect to derive from the violation.50 Be-
cause SBNLs do not commit any significant public resources to increase the 
probability of apprehension and conviction for failures to report breaches, 
the expected value of apprehension and conviction for many businesses will 
be equal to zero. 
SBNLs draw on several legislative models from environmental law and 
other forms of social and economic regulation, including ―community right 
to know legislation,‖ ―technology-forcing legislation,‖ and strict liability in 
tort law. ―Community right to know‖ legislation is one of the most important 
models used. When ―information-forcing‖ legislation, such as CRTK laws 
that force companies to divulge information they would rather not,51 is used 
in combination with direct regulation and other environmental laws to estab-
lish a duty to reduce pollution, together they can increase transparency and 
the effectiveness of government enforcement efforts by providing more ave-
nues for non-governmental organizations such as public interest groups to 
participate in enforcement processes.52 
Within the context of environmental law, the shortcomings of CRTK 
statutes are well known. The most obvious is the problem of requiring regu-
latory subjects to turn over information that they know will be used to im-
pose sanctions against them in an adversarial relationship with regulators.53 
Even if the mandatory disclosures are made at great cost to the regulated ent-
ities, it remains unclear whether information relevant to achieving the under-
lying policy goal has been provided. In the case of SBNLs, a wealth of in-
formation has been disclosed about hundreds of security breaches, but it re-
mains unclear how helpful this information is in analyzing the causes of iden-
                                                                                                                         
 49. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 19 (―A strategy based on persuasion and 
self-regulation will be exploited when actors are motivated by economic rationality.‖). 
 50. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 91 (2d 
ed. 2004) (providing the formula for deterrence with criminal law as pD > U where p is the 
perceived probability of apprehension and conviction, D the costs incurred as a result of 
apprehension and conviction, and U the benefits of violating the law). 
 51. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance, 
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US 298 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott 
eds., 2006) (explaining information-forcing penalties as those that induce disclosure of 
asymmetrically held information).  
 52. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 63. 
 53. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 241 
(2001); Mary Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and 
Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1826-28 (1989). 
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tity theft, or how representative it is of security breaches occurring through-
out the American economy, because there are no estimates of who is not dis-
closing. 
SBNLs also incorporate elements of ―technology-forcing legislation‖ by 
creating an exemption from the duty to provide security breach notices for 
―encrypted,‖ sensitive personal information.
54
 This safe harbor for encrypted 
data may operate like a ―best available technology‖ requirement in environ-
mental law, where agency guidelines for effluent limitation require the use of 
―best available technology economically achievable.‖
55
 Such technology-
based environmental standards have been widely criticized on many grounds: 
regulators pressuring industry to adopt new technologies may fail to antic-
ipate correctly future market developments, or how rapidly industries will be 
able to adapt; rules that are intended to create mandatory minimums or regu-
latory floors turn into regulatory ceilings that inhibit innovation; they focus 
on ―end-of-pipe‖ control technologies,
56
 diverting attention away from pro-
duction processes where problems could be completely eliminated; and they 
compartmentalize regulation, making an integrated, systemic approach to 
dealing with social problems impossible.
57
 The encryption safe harbor in 
SBNLs appears to be suffering from all these shortcomings. Years after the 
first SBNL was enacted, encryption technology is still not widely used by or-
                                                                                                                         
 54. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (2009). 
 55. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (2006). Agency guidelines for 
effluent limitation initially had to require the use of ―best available technology economically 
achievable‖; this standard was later revised to require the use of ―best practicable control 
technology currently available.‖ Compare id. with 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1977).  
 56. Environmental law technology standards that have been criticized for focusing on 
downstream ―end-of-pipe‖ technologies instead of upstream changes in productive 
processes include: Best Practicable Technology (BPT) and Best Available Technology (BAT) 
requirements from the Federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1977); Best Available 
Control Technology (BACT), the standard applied to new pollution emitting facilities under 
the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2006); Best Conventional Technology 
(BCT) requirements from the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (2009); 
Best Demonstrated Available Technology (BDAT), the federal Clean Air Act standard for 
new stationary sources of pollution, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2000); and Lowest Achievable 
Emission Rate (LAER), the federal Clean Air Act standard for new stationary sources nonat-
tainment areas. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (2000). FIORINO, supra note 15, at 73; ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW INSTITUTE, BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND USE 8 
(1998). 
 57. STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 106 (1982); GUNNINGHAM 
& GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 39; OGUS, supra note 50, at 209 (describing regulation based 
on technology-forcing standards as ―specification standards‖ rather than ―performance stan-
dards‖); Richard B. Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Opportunities and 
Obstacles, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 185 
(Richard L. Revesz, Philippe Sands & Richard B. Stewart eds., 2000). 
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ganizations with large databases containing sensitive personal information; 
companies can enjoy the benefit of the safe harbor by the use of weak en-
cryption technologies without adopting a systemic, risk management-based 
approach to information security; and they focus attention on the adoption 
of a single security technology to mitigate harm rather than the overall 
process of securing a system or networks of systems. 
Encryption appears to have a glamour that other security technologies 
may lack, making references to it even more likely to distract from the under-
lying problems:  
Too many engineers consider cryptography to be a sort of magic 
security dust that they can sprinkle over their hardware or software, 
and which will imbue those products with the mythical property of 
―security.‖ Too many consumers read product claims like ―en-
crypted‖ and believe in that same magic security dust. Reviewers 
are no better, comparing things like key lengths and on that basis, 
pronouncing one product to be more secure than another.  
Security is only as strong as the weakest link, and the mathematics 
of cryptography is almost never the weakest link . . . . Security is a 
broad stockade: it‘s the things around the cryptography that make 
the cryptography effective.58 
While many legislators, product vendors and businesses seem to hope 
that encryption will be the ―silver bullet‖ that can solve information security 
problems, encryption has at least two fundamental limitations as a security 
technology.59 First, encryption can protect data at rest and in motion but 
cannot protect data while the data is actually being processed. Second, en-
cryption is only as secure as the weakest link in the system within which it is 
deployed.60 
SBNLs have also borrowed a regulatory model from modern tort law: 
strict liability.61 The legal theory of liability without fault for releasing prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce that are later found to be defective was 
first set forth in a concurrence by Justice Traynor in the famous exploding 
Coke bottle case.62 The California SBNL establishes a form of strict liability 
                                                                                                                         
 58. BRUCE SCHNEIER, PRACTICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY, at xviii (2003) (cited in JOHN R. 
CHRISTIANSEN, AN INTEGRATED STANDARD OF CARE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATION 
SECURITY: HIPAA, RISK MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND (2005)). 
 59. DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 309 (1999). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 969-1046 (2000). 
 62. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 462 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring).  
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for database owners by requiring that they ―shall disclose any breach of the 
security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the 
security of the data‖63 without any reference to any fault on the part of the 
database owner in contributing to the breach. As a result, database owners 
may be liable for harm caused by problems with the data-processing services 
they provide incidental to the provision of other goods or services, a clear 
departure from the common-law standard of care for services. In the absence 
of express contract terms to the contrary, services are normally provided with 
an implied warranty of ―workmanlike services.‖ This warranty resembles a 
negligence standard of care, while the warranty of merchantability, which is 
implied in transactions involving tangible goods, resembles a strict liability 
standard.64 
Many states that used the California law as a model modified this provi-
sion to require notice only if there was a substantial risk that the breach 
might result in harm to the individuals whose personal information was ex-
posed.65 For example, Connecticut enacted a SBNL in 2006 which provides 
that ―notification shall not be required if, after an appropriate investigation 
and consultation with relevant federal, state and local agencies responsible 
for law enforcement, the person reasonably determines that the breach will 
not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal information has 
been acquired and accessed.‖66 But even these ―risk-based‖ notification re-
quirements adjust the database owner‘s duty based on the risk to the person 
whose information was exposed, and they do not take account of whether 
the database owner suffered the breach despite having implemented current 
industry best practices.  
A stronger incentive for database owners to implement information secu-
rity best practices could have been created by diminishing the liability of the 
                                                                                                                         
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that re-
sponsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards 
to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market . . . . 
The injury from a defective product does not become a matter of indiffe-
rence because the defect arises from causes other than the negligence of 
the manufacturer. 
Id. 
 63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (2009). 
 64. DOUGLAS WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON THE SALE AND LEASE OF 
GOODS 183 (5th ed. 2008). 
 65. See generally Michael E. Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private 
Sectors, 3 J.L. & POL‘Y FOR INFO. SOC‘Y 555 (2007) (distinguishing different SBNLs with 
regard to whether they use ―acquisition-based triggers‖ and ―risk-based triggers‖ for notifica-
tion). 
 66. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b(b) (2008). 
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database owner whenever it had taken all feasible steps to prevent the securi-
ty breach from occurring. The ―end-of-pipe‖ perspective on the problem, 
which emphasizes mitigating damages after the problem has occurred instead 
of reducing the risk that the problem will occur in the first place, is also re-
flected in the California Office of Privacy Protection‘s RECOMMENDED 
PRACTICES FOR NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL IN-
FORMATION.67  
In separate legislation enacted in 2004, California recognized a general 
duty of database owners to secure sensitive personal information by requiring 
that any ―business that owns or licenses personal information about a Cali-
fornia resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures 
and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the 
personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modifica-
tion, or disclosure.‖68 This legislation does not provide any guidance with 
regard to what might constitute ―reasonable security procedures,‖ nor does it 
refer to the SBNL enacted earlier, although a plausible interpretation of the 
two statutes suggests that encryption of sensitive data should meet the rea-
sonable security procedure standard.69 Outside the context of California‘s 
statutory duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and 
practices, other regulations have provided more guidance with regard to what 
might constitute reasonable security procedures, and they may prove helpful 
in interpreting the California duty to implement reasonable security proce-
dures.70 These include the Federal Information Security Management Act,71 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Safeguards Rule,72 and the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act Security Rule.73  
Security breach notification laws do not take into account precautions 
taken by database owners before any breach occurs. As a result, an organiza-
tion with a sophisticated information security policy that is subject to more 
vicious attacks than other organizations may suffer a breach and bear the 
same liability as organizations with a complete disregard for information se-
                                                                                                                         
 67. See CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION, CAL. DEP‘T OF CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS, Recommended PRACTICES FOR NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PER-
SONAL INFORMATION (2008), available at http://www.oispp.ca.gov/consumer_privacy/pdf/ 
secbreach.pdf. 
 68. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (2009). 
 69. Chad Pinson, New Legal Frontier: Mass Information Loss and Security Breach, 11 SMU 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 27, 39 (2007). 
 70. See generally WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 5, at § 17. 
 71. Pub. L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2946 (codified as 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541-3549 (2006)). 
 72. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1-.5 (2009). 
 73. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164; see also WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 5, at § 14.03[P][2].  
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curity issues. The problem may be even worse than that: because enforce-
ment of SBNLs depends almost entirely on self-regulation by owners of da-
tabases, then as a practical matter, organizations with good enough security 
policies to realize that they have a problem are exposed to much greater lia-
bility than organizations that are truly clueless. In other words, because 
SBNLs implicitly require database owners to be sophisticated enough to rec-
ognize that problems exist, they do not have any mechanisms for dealing 
with smaller, less sophisticated organizations that do not even realize they are 
suffering security breaches. 
Liability for security breaches covered by SBNLs can be measured by the 
cost of providing notices and other remedial actions such as offering credit 
report monitoring services. In 2005, the Gartner Group estimated that the 
direct cost of a security breach of a single customer record is from $90 up to 
$1,500.74 In 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that the 
total cost of a single breach averaged $1.4 million.75 In 2009, the Ponemon 
Institute reported that the average cost of data breaches had reached $6.3 
million, or $197 per record breached, although the report did not explain 
how this cost was divided among notices, remediation, compensation to vic-
tims and other costs associated with a data breach.76 
That database owners should be held to a strict liability standard rather 
than a negligence standard with regard to security breaches is even more sur-
prising, given that the licensors of the database software they use have gener-
ally been able to avoid any liability for inadequate security. Michael Scott ob-
served: 
                                                                                                                         
 74. JOHN PESCATORE & AVIVAH LITAN, DATA PROTECTION IS LESS COSTLY THAN 
DATA BREACHES 2 (2005), available at http://www3.villanova.edu/gartner/research/-
130900/130911/130911.pdf.  
 75. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACH-
ES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEV-
ER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN, GAO 07-737 (2007), at 34, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf.  
There are also the costs associated with actual notifications—potentially 
including printing, postage, legal, investigative, and public relations ex-
penses. Although comprehensive data on these costs do not exist, a 2006 
Ponemon Institute survey of companies experiencing a data breach found 
that 31 companies that responded incurred an average of $1.4 million per 
breach, or $54 per record breached, for costs related to mailing notifica-
tion letters, call center expenses, courtesy discounts or services, and legal 
fees. 
Id. 
 76. THE PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2008 ANNUAL STUDY: U.S. ENTERPRISE ENCRYPTION 
TRENDS 2 (2008), available at http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/general-
content/18/file/2008_Annual_Study_US_Encryption_Trends_280308.pdf. 
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Software vulnerabilities cost businesses and consumers tens of bil-
lions of dollars each year. Every day brings news of freshly discov-
ered security flaws in major software products. While Microsoft, 
due to its prominence in the operating system market, gets the 
brunt of the criticism for these flaws, there are many other compa-
nies whose software is also targeted for security-related complaints. 
Yet, software vendors have traditionally refused to take responsibil-
ity for the security of their software, and have used various risk al-
location provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to 
shift the risk of insecure software to the licensee. There were a few 
early cases in which licensees sought to have courts hold vendors 
liable for distributing defective software. These cases were unsuc-
cessful.77 
The exemption of software developers from liability for inadequate secu-
rity is due to a variety of factors. Decades ago, software development was 
seen as a service rather than a product.78 More recently, courts have been re-
luctant to apply products liability concepts to software on the grounds that it 
is not a tangible product.79 In addition, vendors that market products to assist 
database owners with SBNL compliance are generally selling products to as-
sist in monitoring vulnerabilities and generating reports, not products to re-
move vulnerabilities.80 So companies with databases of sensitive personal in-
formation cannot simply shift their exposure under SBNLs by contract to 
other enterprises such as database software vendors, who appear to be in a 
much better position to reduce the incidence of security breaches.  
California‘s pioneering SBNL was a radical innovation that is influencing 
privacy and information legislation around the world.81 It creates an impor-
tant new consumer right to receive information in an area in which consum-
ers formerly had no entitlement at all. While the SBNL may have achieved its 
drafters‘ goals of imposing a modest sanction on database owners who fail to 
safeguard the sensitive personal information of their customers, its value as a 
                                                                                                                         
 77. Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally 
Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 426 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 461. 
 79. Id. at 464; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19, cmt. d, Reporter‘s Note (1998). 
 80. See, e.g., Agiliance Product Overview, http://www.agiliance.com/products/-
overview.html (last visited May 30, 2009). 
 81. See, e.g., Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC, Directive 2002/58/EC, and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004, 
COM (2007) 698 final (Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_-
society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/dir_citizens_rights_en.pdf; AUSTRALIAN 
LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Introducing a mandatory data breach notification scheme (Aug. 
11, 2008), available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/media/2008/mbn6.pdf. 
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model for information security law reforms is uncertain at best. Due to its 
limited scope, ex post focus on notice of problems rather than an ex ante 
focus on effective solutions, failure to provide concrete incentives to product 
developers to reduce risks at a systemic level, and lack of any public en-
forcement system, California‘s SBNL provides only limited, distorted incen-
tives to database owners to act decisively to reduce the volume of security 
breaches. 
IV. CHALLENGES OF REDUCING SECURITY BREACHES 
Looking at SBNLs as a bundle of information-forcing, technology-
forcing and strict liability rules, it is clear that they suffer from serious struc-
tural flaws. This form of regulation might be adequate, however, if it were 
applied to an easier problem than improving security for collections of sensi-
tive personal information. As with the causes of pollution in the natural envi-
ronment, the causes of bad information security are too complex to rectify 
with such flawed legislative strategies. Just as it has become apparent in envi-
ronmental law that pollution is a symptom of the larger problem of unsus-
tainable economic development, it should also be apparent that security 
breaches are symptoms of larger technical and institutional problems. 
In part, the technical problems are caused by the fact that applications 
are being developed and deployed without adequate attention to security 
faster than information security solutions can be created and applied.82 The 
problem of low returns for investments in information security emerged dec-
ades ago when computing became a popular phenomenon, and computer 
systems were no longer isolated in cold rooms with access denied to all but a 
select few.83 Less sophisticated users of information technology products are 
not in a good position to appreciate the risks caused by lack of attention to 
computer security, and they are easily frustrated by any diminution in func-
                                                                                                                         
 82. In January 2009, the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute an-
nounced that 
experts from more than 30 US and international cyber security organiza-
tions jointly released the consensus list of the 25 most dangerous pro-
gramming errors that lead to security bugs and that enable cyber espio-
nage and cyber crime. Shockingly, most of these errors are not well un-
derstood by programmers; their avoidance is not widely taught by com-
puter science programs; and their presence is frequently not tested by or-
ganizations developing software for sale. 
Bob Martin, Experts Announce Agreement on the 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors 
- And How to Fix Them, http://www.sans.org/top25errors/ (last visited May 30, 2009). 
 83. Lewis University, A Brief History of Information Security, available at 
http://www.lewisu.edu/academics/msinfosec/history.htm (last visited June 25, 2009). 
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tion associated with increased security.84 Information asymmetries between 
producers and consumers of information technology products and services, 
and strong network effects that can easily produce a ―first mover‖ effect,85 
have resulted in chronic failures in information technology product markets 
evidenced by the externalization of many of the costs of bad security onto 
third parties.86 These market failures are exacerbated in part by underinvest-
ment in basic information security research because basic research has many 
of the features of a public good.87 In addition, to the extent that information 
security is created with products and services distributed within networked 
markets, adoption of those products and services will be hindered whenever 
end users fear their use may fragment existing networks through lack of 
standardization or because competition among different standards fails to 
produce a single dominant standard strong enough to create a new network.88  
This institutional problem grows out of conflicts among the current so-
cial norms of business administration and legislative mandates that require 
significant changes in those norms. Most businesses have not yet modified 
their organizational norms to integrate ―operational risk‖89 or ―information 
assurance‖90 policies systematically into all management systems.91 Until the 
2008 financial crisis, many American consumers appeared to think access to 
                                                                                                                         
 84. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., TRUST IN CYBERSPACE 182 (Fred Schneid-
er ed., 1999). 
 85. First-mover advantages are created when an organization has a technological lead 
on its competitors, can block competitors‘ access to certain assets, and its customers have 
high switching costs. Marvin B. Leiberman & and David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advan-
tages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 41-58 (Summer 1988). First-mover advantages frequently 
arise in markets defined by networks. CARL SHAPIRO AND & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION 
RULES 168-69 (1999). 
 86. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 84, at 251. 
 87. Id. at 244. 
 88. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 85, at 168-69. 
 89. Operational risk was originally defined to capture all sources of risk other than 
market risk and credit risk. Rob Jameson, Operational Risk: Getting the Measure of the Beast, 
RISK, Nov. 1998, at 38. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the definition of opera-
tional risk. 
 90. Information assurance is defined by the National Security Agency as the ―protec-
tion of information systems against unauthorized access to, or modification of, information, 
whether in storage, processing or transit, and protection against the denial of service to au-
thorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such 
threats.‖ National Security Agency, Frequently Asked Questions: Terms and Acronyms, 
http://www.nsa.gov/about/faqs/terms_acronyms.shtml (last visited May 30, 2009). 
 91. David Farmer, Operational Risk Management and the Risk Governance Challenge, GT 
NEWS (May 20, 2008), available at http://www.gtnews.com/article/7268.cfm (―While regula-
tory developments, such as Basel II and Sarbanes Oxley, have accelerated the implementa-
tion of enterprise risk management frameworks, operational risk management remains rela-
tively unchanged with many organisations steaming ahead like the Titanic.‖). 
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credit was a more fundamental human right than information privacy and 
were happily complicit in the commodification of their sensitive personal 
information because it reduced barriers to obtaining the credit necessary to 
consume at will.92 Most vendors of information assurance products and ser-
vices have little or no incentive to make the social norm reform dimension of 
the problem clear because, at least in the short term, they can often sell more 
of their products if they can convince their customers that their product pro-
vides a technological ―silver bullet‖ to solve their problems. 
In some economic sectors, traditional direct regulation has been used to 
pressure businesses to overcome social norms of inattention to operational 
risk. For example, during safety and soundness examinations of regulated 
depository institutions, bank examiners consider market risk, credit risk, and 
operational risk.93 Even though operational risk has traditionally received less 
attention than market and credit risk,94 it has nevertheless received more at-
tention in financial services industries than in most other industries. In the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II Guidelines), ―opera-
tional risk‖ is defined as ―the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems or from external events.‖95 One rea-
son operation risk management is less well developed than market or credit 
risk management for financial institutions is the dearth of publicly available 
operational risk data. 
This is in direct contrast to market risk and credit risk, for which 
data are widely available . . . . Although operational risk was origi-
nally defined to capture all sources of risk other than market risk 
and credit risk, several more specific definitions of operational risk 
                                                                                                                         
 92. See generally LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: DEBT, CREDIT, 
AND THE MAKING OF A CONSUMER SOCIETY 1890-1940 (1999) (discussing the centrality of 
easy credit to American popular culture since colonial times).  
 93. 2-37 Banking Law § 37.04. 
 94. Philip Alexander, Risk Management Bites Back, BANKER, Oct. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/6049/Risk_Management_bites_back_.
html (―Many practitioners suggest that . . . operational risk [management] has been the poor 
relation of [other forms of risk management].‖). 
 95. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 134 (2004), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf; see also BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVI-
SION, SOUND PRACTICES FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONAL 
RISK (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs96.pdf. 
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have become well known, [most notably, the definition in the Basel 
II Guidelines].96 
Effective management of operational risk is integral to the business of 
banking and to institutions‘ roles as financial intermediaries. Although opera-
tional risk is not a new risk, deregulation and globalization of financial servic-
es—together with the growing sophistication of financial technology, new 
business activities and delivery channels—are making the operational risk 
profiles of institutions (i.e. the level of operational risk across an institution‘s 
activities and risk categories) more complex.97 
Outside of industries where outside auditors are required to examine how 
operational risks are handled, there has been much less management atten-
tion to operational risk issues, although there is evidence this may slowly be 
changing. Panjer notes: 
Operational risk has only in recent years been identified as some-
thing that should be actively measured and managed in a company 
in order to meet its objectives for stakeholders, including share-
holders, customers, and management . . . . Operational risk is be-
coming a major part of corporate governance of companies.98 
Just as with regulated financial institutions, the operational risk profiles of 
businesses throughout the economy are increasing in complexity as the use 
of information technology becomes pervasive within business administration 
systems.99 After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act100 imposed new obligations on ex-
ecutives of publicly listed companies to maintain effective internal controls, 
publicly listed companies in the United States are now under an obligation 
similar to that of regulated financial institutions to manage operational risk.101 
Yet American businesses that are not publicly listed companies may have few 
concrete incentives to sort out competing vendor claims, identify current 
best practices, and embark on a program of rigorously implementing best 
                                                                                                                         
 96. HARRY H. PANJER, OPERATIONAL RISKS: MODELING ANALYTICS 3, 5 (2006). 
 97. Internet Ratings-Based Systems for Corporate Credit and Operational Risk Ad-
vanced Measurement Approaches for Regulatory Capital, 68 Fed. Reg. 45949 (Aug. 4, 2003). 
 98. PANJER, supra note 96, at 3, 5. 
 99. GUY BUNKER & GARETH FRASER-KING, DATA LEAKS FOR DUMMIES 10-20 
(2009). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2009). 
 101. Analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley internal control requirements is beyond the scope of 
this Article. See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPEC-
TIVE (2003).  
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practices.102 According to a 2005 survey cited by the Better Business Bureau, 
small businesses in America generally do not understand the true economic 
impact of information security exposures or the nature of the threats they 
need to manage against, and they tend to be much more reactive than proac-
tive in their thinking about information security.103 The volume of security 
breaches reported by major enterprises and government agencies in recent 
years indicates that small businesses are not the only organizations that are 
not dealing effectively with information assurance challenges.104 
For any business of any size not currently required to focus on opera-
tional risk, the cost of adopting for the first time a systematic approach to 
operational risk management can be enormous, while the rewards may be 
remote and uncertain. The academic literature on ―business process reengi-
neering‖ (BPR) has exhaustively documented the costs and benefits of 
achieving lasting change in organization values as a strategy for improving a 
firm‘s competitive position.105 While the central focus of BPR is identifying 
and strengthening the value-creating activities within a firm,106 BPR also 
normally includes a shift to adaptive management processes that provide a 
framework within which comprehensive risk management becomes feasi-
ble.107 
Few businesses will undertake a process as difficult, expensive and uncer-
tain as BPR without a powerful external trigger.108 In order for SBNLs to 
provide such a trigger ex ante, the cost of compliance would have to appear 
to managers to be greater than the cost of enforcement sanctions discounted 
                                                                                                                         
 102. See, e.g., Anthony Savvas, UK Security Bodies Form Security Awareness Forum, COMPUT-
ER WKLY, Feb. 13, 2008 (―According to the Forum, one of the biggest problems facing or-
ganisations and individuals is a lack of information security awareness, with people either not 
knowing about, ignoring or circumventing security processes and technical countermea-
sures.‖). 
 103. Better Business Bureau, Small Business Mistakes and Vulnerabilities, 
http://www.bbb.org/us/corporate-engagement/small-business-mistakes/ (last visited May 
30, 2009). 
 104. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Security Fix - Data Breach Reports up 69 Percent in 2008, WASH. 
POST, June 30, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/06/data_-
breach_reports_up_69_perc_1.html; Andrew Sparrow, „Inexcusable‟ Security Breaches Still Occur-
ring, Says Information Commissioner, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/apr/22/whitehall.voluntarysector/. 
 105. See generally MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES CHAMPY, REENGINEERING THE CORPO-
RATION (1993). 
 106. MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1985). 
 107. Enid Mumford, Risky Ideas in the Risk Society, 11 J. INFO. TECH. 321-31 (1996). 
Adaptive management systems, also known as PDCA [Plan-Do-Check-Act] Cycles, are dis-
cussed further infra Part V. 
 108. HAMMER & CHAMPY, supra note 105, at 149-50. 
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by the probability of enforcement action. If the managers of most businesses, 
especially those that are not public companies, believe the probability that 
unreported security breaches will be detected is negligible, then the cost of 
compliance will always be higher than the cost of sanctions. By contrast, 
SBNLs may provide a significant trigger ex post for BPR in companies that 
suffer a data breach that attracts widespread attention, whether through vo-
luntary disclosure or otherwise, because of the reputational harm caused by 
disclosure. While dozens or even hundreds of American businesses that have 
suffered data breaches that resulted in widespread public controversy and 
criticism may have undertaken BPR in order to achieve lasting changes in 
organization norms and lasting improvements in information security, it is 
unclear how many of the hundreds of thousands of American businesses that 
have not suffered such public humiliations have been similarly motivated. 
One reason that SBNLs create weak incentives for change in business 
social norms is that they apply to enterprises in all sectors of the economy 
but do not designate a regulatory authority or provide any mechanisms for 
consistent, vigorous enforcement. Law reforms similar in substance to 
SBNLs targeting specific industry sectors and supported by strong govern-
ment funded enforcement efforts might have much greater impact within 
those industries. For example, in 2005, federal bank and thrift regulatory 
agencies jointly issued regulations requiring depository institutions in the 
United States to provide notice of security breaches to their customers.109 
Depository institutions cannot operate without a license, which is granted 
subject to an ongoing duty to submit to ongoing government examina-
tions.110 Financial regulators communicate their regulatory proprieties by 
providing management of depository institutions with updated examination 
guidelines containing detailed explanations of their standards and then con-
ducting examinations based on those new standards. If financial regulators 
believe security breach notices are important, they have all the regulatory lev-
ers they need to cause depository institutions to become scrupulously atten-
tive to the problems of detecting security breaches and sending notices. By 
contrast, general business and commercial activities are regulated by private 
law, and the rights and obligations of the parties are normally enforced 
through private litigation. As a result, there is no regulatory authority in the 
U.S. with a clear mandate to investigate information security risk manage-
ment policies or enter into negotiations with management of most American 
                                                                                                                         
 109. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Cus-
tomer Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15736 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 110. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE 
LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 73-74 (4th ed. 2009). 
1133-1166 WINN WEB 053010 
2009] “BETTER” SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 1157 
businesses regarding necessary changes to achieve compliance with 
SBNLs.111 
Within the market for information security products, self-regulatory insti-
tutions are not yet well enough developed to take the place of direct govern-
ment regulation. Information security is a new industry dealing with new 
problems that continue to evolve at a rapid pace. The most concrete, applied 
information about improving information security is generally provided to 
businesses by product and service vendors trying to sell something, creating a 
potential conflict of interest between teacher and student. In more mature 
industries, a wide range of public and private institutions normally exist that 
can offer more disinterested information and training to businesses. These 
include the Better Business Bureau, local chambers of commerce, various 
trade associations, and in agriculture, agricultural extension offices main-
tained with public funds. In markets for information security products and 
services, these ―third sector‖ institutions are fewer, and those that exist are 
much less mature. Smart regulation advocates would predict that investment 
of public resources in educational outreach organizations together with in-
vestment in enforcement is likely to have a much greater impact on com-
pliance than investment in either enforcement or educational outreach 
alone.112 
While there are no national statistics on the use of encryption products 
by American businesses, anecdotal information suggests that sales of encryp-
tion software and business use of encryption technologies have increased 
only slowly since the first SBNL was enacted in 2003.113 This suggests that 
the ―safe harbor‖ in SBNLs for enterprises that encrypted sensitive data be-
fore any breach occurred has either provided very weak incentives to invest 
in encryption technologies, or that the ―total cost of ownership‖ of encryp-
tion technologies may be higher than legislators believed when they created 
the safe harbor. If the cost of using encryption technologies in a manner that 
significantly reduces the risk of harm when a security breach occurs is higher 
than legislators realized, it may be because few business software applications 
                                                                                                                         
 111. The Federal Trade Commission has been making tentative steps in that direction, 
but lacks a clear statutory basis for doing so. For discussion of Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) information security enforcement actions see WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 5, 
§ 17.06[E]. See also Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine and Data Security Breach 
Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 173 (2008).  
 112. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 50-56, 60-65. 
 113. While attending the RSA 2009 conference in April 2009, the author asked repre-
sentatives of half a dozen major vendors of encryption products about trends in the sales of 
their products. All reported slow but steady increases, and rejected the suggestion that 
SBNLs had fueled a sharp increase in demand for encryption products. 
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for processing data already incorporated encryption technologies in 2003, 
and it has proven difficult to add encryption to software products or infor-
mation systems without creating new problems.114 It may also be because it is 
difficult to make effective use of a single technology such as encryption un-
less it is embedded in a larger overhaul of management processes and infor-
mation technology systems characteristic of BPR. For example, in order to 
achieve significant reductions in the risk of data breaches, an enterprise must 
normally: 
Create data-protection policies recognizing different levels of security for 
different types of data and provide ongoing staff training to support 
its implementation; 
Apply those policies by identifying data that requires higher levels of se-
curity, and identifying all places where sensitive data has been stored; 
Restrict access to sensitive data on an ―as needed‖ basis through the use 
of access controls and encryption of stored data and data during 
transmission; 
Implement policies governing archived data, including destruction of da-
ta that is no longer needed or which may not be preserved; 
Take steps to block the storage of sensitive data on portable devices un-
less access to the data is authorized and the data can be encrypted; 
[and] 
Continuously review and update data-protection policies in light of new 
threats, new technologies and new business processes.115 
Market pressures to create, store, and share as much data as possible 
without regard to security issues are intense, and they certainly appear to be 
strong enough to overwhelm whatever impact modest law reforms such as 
SBNLs may have on business incentives to safeguard the sensitive personal 
information they control. The cost of technologies used to create, store, and 
share data continues to fall, while the development of new business models 
offer tangible, immediate rewards for sharing and reuse of sensitive data.116 
Over the last half century, the use of business information systems has 
exploded, transforming administrative systems and resulting in the collection, 
storage and use of unprecedented volumes of data of every conceivable type. 
                                                                                                                         
 114. See supra note 113. 
 115. GUY BUNKER & GARETH FRASER-KING, supra note 99, at 26, 375-78. 
 116. Id. at 10-20. 
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In recent decades, networks connecting separate business information sys-
tems have also grown explosively. The main ―driver‖ for this increased busi-
ness use of data has been the search for short-term competitive advantage, 
while too often, too little emphasis has been placed on information system 
security. This is hardly surprising, given the difficulty of securing open com-
puter networks such as the Internet and the absence of a clear liability 
scheme requiring attention to information security. Regulators trying to force 
businesses to internalize the costs of better information security face a task 
equivalent to turning the Queen Mary: achieving even modest improvements 
in business orientation may require major changes in the way business infor-
mation systems are developed and used. SBNLs target only one small piece 
of this larger problem, leaving in place many of the market failures and per-
verse incentives that fueled the growth of the problem in the first place. If 
reducing security breaches is a legitimate and important policy goal, then a 
very different legislative approach may be required to achieve it. 
V. CAN SBNLS GET “BETTER?” 
A ―better regulation‖ approach to the challenge of incorporating infor-
mation security risk assessments into management processes would look for 
the combination of policy instruments most likely to achieve that result. 
Ayres and Braithwaite noted that enforcement regimes that are too harsh or 
too permissive are both likely to fail, while regimes that emphasize public-
private collaboration and selectively resort to punitive enforcement strategies 
in response to evidence of willful non-compliance are generally most likely to 
achieve positive outcomes.117 SBNLs provide no framework within which 
public-private collaboration can take place to improve compliance over time; 
rather, companies are left to navigate the maze of competing information 
security product vendor claims with few reliable standards for guidance. 
SBNLs provide most businesses with few positive incentives to encourage 
disclosure but many negative incentives to discourage it.118 Furthermore, 
SBNLs establish an inequitable strict liability regime because when breaches 
occur they do not distinguish between companies that implement informa-
tion security best practices and those that show a reckless disregard for the 
security of sensitive data. The severity of the sanctions imposed in terms of 
the cost of providing notices is a function of the volume of data exposed, not 
the wrongfulness of the conduct that led to the breach, so some companies 
                                                                                                                         
 117. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 40-41. 
 118. The problem is well recognized with regard to environmental ―right-to-know‖ laws. 
See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, supra note 53, at 1826-28.  
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may suffer a sanction that is punitive. In other words, SBNLs completely fail 
to meet the standard of ―responsive regulation.‖ 
From the perspective of policy rather than political expediency, what 
would a ―responsive regulation‖ framework designed to reduce security 
breaches by improving information security practices at the firm level look 
like? It would most likely be made up of a variety of policy instruments de-
signed to complement each other, which would likely include strategies to 
increase voluntary compliance and self-regulation as well as direct regulations 
providing for some form of ex ante audit or examination functions and ex 
post public enforcement. For example, Congress might decide to recognize 
that customers, suppliers and employees of businesses are entitled to expect 
that sensitive information will be handled responsibly by establishing a legally 
enforceable duty on the part of database owners to take reasonable precau-
tions to prevent sensitive data from being accessed without authorization. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could then be given the authority to 
issue regulations to clarify essential elements of this new duty such as what 
constitutes ―reasonable precautions‖ and ―sensitive data‖ and ―unauthorized 
access.‖ Just as independent self-regulatory organizations119 perform essential 
functions in the regulation of securities markets and in assessing whether 
products conform to technical standards,120 FTC regulations could recognize 
a role for independent certification authorities in information security mar-
kets, and create a presumption that ―reasonable precautions‖ have been tak-
en by businesses whose information security has been certified compliant 
with a recognized industry standard. 
This approach to reducing the incidence and severity of security breaches 
would solve several problems associated with SBNLs: it would establish the 
general, foundational duty of information assurance necessary to support the 
operation of a ―right-to-know‖ regulation; it would end the piecemeal, sec-
toral approach currently taken to information security regulation in the Unit-
ed States and establish a uniform, minimum standard for all enterprises that 
handle sensitive data, not just those in regulated industries; and it would not 
mandate the use of a particular technology but allow the meaning of ―rea-
sonable precautions‖ to be based on risk assessments; and it would grant an 
agency authority to enforce the duty. 
                                                                                                                         
 119. Under U.S. securities law, the National Association of Securities Dealers and stock 
exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange are recognized as ―self-regulating organi-
zations‖ that regulate their members. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2009); see also GUNNINGHAM & GRA-
BOSKY, supra note 9, at 65-66. 
 120. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, AND 
TRADE: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (1995).  
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Smart regulation is intended to optimize the structure and content of 
regulation in order to increase its effectiveness. Evidence is clear in other 
areas of social regulation that this requires an integrated approach to the in-
terplay between legislation, enforcement, and social norms.121 An integrated 
approach requires a balanced combination of direct regulation in the form of 
a statutory duty of information assurance combined with appropriate levels 
of funding for public investigation and enforcement efforts, indirect regula-
tion in terms of private liability to data subjects for harm caused by security 
breaches, enforced self-regulation in the form of independent third-party au-
dits of adaptive management systems, and self-regulation in the form of vo-
luntary industry-based standards and education programs. Clarification of the 
duty and funding for enforcement would begin to tip the balance of the cost 
of compliance versus probability of enforcement; under such circumstances, 
caps on liability in private litigation could be justified. Many standards con-
formity-assessment authorities already exist, and government regulators 
could play a role in recognizing those whose competence and independence 
meet minimum standards to overcome information asymmetries between 
businesses needing conformity certification and certification providers. With 
widespread use of adaptive management systems to implement comprehen-
sive information technology risk management policies, the nature of business 
requirements for information assurance products and services might be clari-
fied to the point where greater standardization of information assurance 
technologies becomes possible. Such standardization would increase compe-
tition among vendors and reduce barriers to adoption of comprehensive risk 
management strategies by less sophisticated, private companies that currently 
have little or no awareness of information assurance issues. Voluntary indus-
try efforts to provide educational outreach could complement publicly subsi-
dized ―information assurance extension office‖ educational outreach efforts. 
This integrated approach is based on an ex ante assessment of the causes of 
the underlying problem of poor information security practices, and it focuses 
on making large-scale compliance feasible. 
Confronted with the complex, multi-polar institutional framework of 
business information systems, the California legislature asserted jurisdiction 
over only two parties and crafted a bi-polar solution that resembles the hold-
ing of a case more than it resembles modern regulation: California citizens 
were given a right of notice of problems occurring at businesses serving 
them. Given the limited impact that SBNLs have had to date in pressuring 
businesses to make fundamental changes in their information security prac-
                                                                                                                         
 121. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 9, at 56-60. 
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tices, the most obvious next step for the California legislature is to create a 
private cause of action to allow California citizens against businesses suffer-
ing security breaches that affect their sensitive personal information.122 Such 
a change would be completely consistent with the American regulatory style 
that relies heavily on public and private litigation to achieve regulatory objec-
tives.123 The social consequences of such a regulatory approach are well 
known: unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes in different courts, imposi-
tion of high litigation costs on regulated entities in addition to compliance 
costs, defensive posturing by regulated entities in advance of any litigation, 
erosion of trust, and loss of opportunities for constructive engagement 
among stakeholders.124 Given the complexity of the causes of current infor-
mation-security problems of American businesses and the current shortage 
of cost-effective solutions to those problems, the costs of a more adversarial 
strategy seem very likely to outweigh the benefits of a more flexible, colla-
borative approach.125 
An adversarial approach to improving the security of business informa-
tion systems was recently tried with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act (―FACTA‖) credit card receipt rule, and the result was a flood of 
class action lawsuits with the imposition on businesses of major litigation 
costs, resulting in negligible improvements in information security.126 In 
2003, Congress enacted ―technology-forcing‖ legislation127 to require retail 
merchants to modify point-of-sale systems to block out expiration dates and 
most digits in credit card numbers.128 A 2007 deadline was set, and a private 
cause of action together with statutory damages was created.129 The result has 
been hundreds of class action lawsuits, and a flood of judicial decisions that 
produced a bewildering array of results.130 In response to the tidal wave of 
                                                                                                                         
 122. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Securing the HIPAA Security Rule, J. 
INTERNET L., Feb. 2007, at 6 (advocating a private cause of action for violations of the HI-
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 123. KAGAN, supra note 53, at 182. 
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nology-Forcing, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T 64 (1995) (defining ―technology-forcing‖ legisla-
tion). 
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litigation unleashed by the FACTA credit card receipt provisions, Congress 
enacted the Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 to pro-
vide that printing expiration dates on receipts where the account number is 
otherwise properly truncated does not by itself constitute willful non-
compliance, eliminating at least some of ambiguity in the text of the FACTA 
credit card receipt rule.131 
By contrast, the recent ―Identity Theft Red Flag Guidelines‖ issued by 
the FTC and federal financial regulators is an example of a ―smart‖ approach 
to using regulation to reduce the risk of identity theft.132 The Red Flags Rules 
apply to licensed depository institutions and ―creditors,‖ which include any 
entity that regularly extends credit, with regard to accounts used for payment 
transactions.133 Under the Red Flags Rules, financial institutions and creditors 
must develop a written program that identifies and detects the relevant warn-
ing signs of identity theft.134 These may include, for example, unusual account 
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activity, fraud alerts on a consumer report, or attempted use of suspicious 
account application documents. The program must also describe appropriate 
responses that would prevent and mitigate the crime and detail a plan to up-
date the program.135 The program must be managed by the Board of Direc-
tors or senior employees of the financial institution or creditor, include ap-
propriate staff training, and provide for oversight of any service providers.136 
In addition to the Red Flags Rules, the regulators also issued guidelines that 
provide detailed analysis of examples of possible red flags.137 After the Red 
Flags Rule was issued, FTC staff engaged in outreach to raise awareness of 
the rule and to provide training and support to industry associations‘ own 
outreach and training efforts.138 The Red Flags Rule is intended to promote 
the use of adaptive management systems to reduce the risk of identity theft 
by changing business administrative systems. 
The Red Flags Rule demonstrates that even though the term ―better reg-
ulation‖ is not generally used to describe U.S. legislation, many of the tenants 
of better regulation are well known and can be used effectively in the United 
States, and that a slide into adversarial legalism—in the form of expanded 
tort liability and class action litigation—is not a foregone conclusion. So 
while a comprehensive regulatory framework to provide database owners 
with stronger incentives to improve information security remains unlikely in 
the United States, it remains possible that elements of a better regulation leg-
islative approach may be chosen. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Many different factors contribute to the problem of security breaches: 
explosive growth in the use of information technologies in business adminis-
tration processes that has outpaced growth in the science and engineering of 
information security; weaker models for managing operational risk than other 
forms of risk encountered by businesses; software and information technolo-
gy vendor success in avoiding liability for the problems caused by their lack 
of attention to information security; and the commodification of sensitive 
personal information. SBNLs may be having some impact on some of the 
                                                                                                                         
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. FTC Business Alert, New ‗Red Flag‘ Requirements for Financial Institutions and 
Creditors Will Help Fight Identity Theft (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/-
pubs/business/alerts/alt050.pdf. 
 138. FTC Extended Enforcement Policy: Identity Theft Red Flags Rule, 16 CFR 681.1 
(2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/04/P095406redflagsextendedenforcement-
.pdf. 
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factors contributing to the problem of security breaches, but due to their 
modest scope, that impact will be no more than modest at best. In addition 
to their modest scope, SBNLs suffer from some design flaws that will also 
undermine their effectiveness. Because SBNLs do not provide for audits or 
public enforcement, many database owners may decide that the expected 
cost of non-compliance is close to zero and not increase their investment in 
information security. SBNLs also include information-forcing provisions, 
which place disclosure obligations on those with powerful incentives to dis-
close as little as possible, as well as ―end-of-pipe‖ technology-forcing provi-
sions, which often suppress innovation and create perverse incentives to in-
vest in mitigating harms after they occur instead of prevention. They also 
impose strict liability on organizations that cannot in turn pass that liability 
on to the information technology producers who are normally in a better po-
sition than database owners to fix problems with information security. Add-
ing a private cause of action for individuals whose personal information has 
been exposed against database owners without guaranteeing database owners 
a similar right to recover from vendors of products with defective security 
would create only indirect and relatively weak incentives to improve the secu-
rity of business information systems. 
A ―better‖ approach to security breach regulation would begin with a 
better understanding of the challenges facing database owners, look for op-
portunities to promote voluntary collaboration and self-regulation, and mi-
nimize confrontation and the taking of defensive measures in order to mi-
nimize litigation risks. Some form of direct regulation is likely to be necessary 
to address free-riding and opportunism by organizations that would other-
wise seek to exploit the weak enforcement mechanisms available within vo-
luntary or self-regulatory systems. Although the turn toward ―deregulation‖ 
that began with the first Bush Administration in the 1980s may now be over, 
it is unclear whether the political will exists in the United States to enact any 
information security regulations that do not fit the ―adversarial legalism‖ 
mold of class action lawsuits to enforce private causes of action. So SBNLs 
may be the best legal protection that American consumers are offered against 
breaches of security that expose their sensitive personal information, even if 
they are not ―better‖ regulation. 
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